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ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES AIR FORCES CENTRAL 






This project investigates the viability of performing United States Air Forces Central 
(USAFCENT) government purchase card (GPC) purchases by utilizing reachback 
services.  The study analyzed FY 2011 data to include the number of deployed 
contingency contracting officers (CCOs), GPC actions, and total contract actions at each 
Expeditionary Contracting Squadron.  Using this data, models were developed that 
showed potential reductions in deployed CCOs if GPC actions were sent from 
USAFCENT area of responsibility to a stateside reachback cell.   
The study provides recommendations based on the potential reductions of 
deployed CCOs.  One such recommendation is to stand up a test reachback cell.  This cell 
will employ the recommended number of personnel developed by the models in this 
project. 
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This paper analyzes the viability of performing USAFCENT GPC purchases 
utilizing a stateside reachback cell.  Centralizing GPC purchases at a stateside reachback 
cell reduces the deployment burden on the contracting career field, increases the 
deployment pool by utilizing contracting officers deemed ineligible to deploy, and gains 
efficiencies by requiring less personnel to do the same amount of work.  Through 
analysis of USAFCENT FY11 data, this study determined that with implementation of a 
stateside reachback cell, current CCO manning can be reduced anywhere from 9.3% to 
42.33% based on the number of GPC actions sent to the reachback cell. 
This study recommends USAFCENT needs to establish a reachback test cell for 
one full year in order put the theory into practice.  By creating a test cell, efficiencies, 
best practices, proper funding, and appropriate manning can be analyzed.  Second, 
reachback capabilities should be included in current operations and future contingency 
plans.  Approaching reachback with a strategic mindset allows the best utilization of 
personnel and resources for the combatant commander.   
 
 2
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 3
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the layout 
of our research.  In Section B, we provide background information related to our 
research; specifically, we define the concept of reachback and identify the status of U.S. 
Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) contracting.  In Section C, we describe our purpose and 
the applicability of alternative methods to supporting contingency contracting efforts.  In 
Section D, we present the significance of our research in terms of its deeper effects on 
Air Force (AF) leadership, personnel, and families.  In Section F, we use research 
questions to present a guideline for how we conducted our study, and, in Section E, we 
provide a roadmap of our methodology and our report. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The concept of reachback support for military operations is not a new idea.  In a 
military supply-chain system, receiving supplies and services from the location closest to 
the warfighter is not always the best method.  The quality of these supplies and services 
could dramatically change from one country to the next, and these quality concerns could 
have a serious impact on the wellness and safety of the warfighter.  Reachback support 
provides a method to obtain supplies and services from suppliers and vendors closest to 
the originating location of the supply chain, which is usually in the contiguous United 
States. 
USAFCENT, based out of Shaw Air Force Base (AFB), Sumter, South Carolina, 
currently provides supplies and services for operations in 20 countries (U.S. Air Forces 
Central Command, 2011). An important cog in this supply chain is the Contingency 
Contracting Officer (CCO).  The CCO is responsible for researching and purchasing 
supplies and services to support these operations, while also acting as a steward of U.S. 
taxpayers’ dollars.  The CCO must make critical decisions on whether to purchase locally 
(i.e., where the operation is currently taking place) or to purchase back in the U.S.  CCOs 
must also decide whether they should purchase a quality product with a longer delivery 
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time or a shoddy product with quick delivery in order to support the mission.  One of the 
tools CCOs have to aid them in purchasing is the Government Purchase Card (GPC).  
The GPC allows a CCO to purchase supplies and services up to $30,000 in a declared 
contingency environment or $15,000 from stateside vendors (FAR, 2011, § 2.101).  In 
our research, we collected data on the percentage of GPC purchases CCOs made locally 
versus stateside.  This data is further explained in Chapter IV, but it is important to 
realize that CCOs use the GPC heavily to purchase supplies from the U.S.  
 C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of our research is to present the applicability of alternatives to 
deploying CCOs to the Area of Responsibility (AOR) that will still accomplish the 
AOR’s mission.  AF contracting is considered a critical skilled career field and retention 
levels are not on par with overall AF retention levels (Department of the Air Force 
Presentation, 2011).  AF CCOs deploy for anywhere from a 1:1 dwell to a 1:4 dwell.  A 
1:1 dwell means CCOs are home for six months and then deployed for six months, and so 
on.  A 1:4 dwell means CCOs are home for two years and then deployed for six months.  
The majority of the enlisted force operates at a 1:1 dwell (Correll, 2010).  As mentioned 
in Section A, CCOs use the GPC to make purchases from stateside locations.  From the 
perspective of a supply-chain model, we can ask, why is there a need for a CCO to make 
stateside purchases from a forward deployed location?  Using a reachback concept, the 
AOR could send requirements to a contracting officer in the U.S., who could make the 
purchase and arrange for delivery of the item to the AOR.  This reachback support could 
potentially save AF human assets from deploying.   
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
As of October 3, 2011, 57 CCOs were deployed to the USAFCENT AOR.  These 
CCOs, both officers and enlisted personnel, are pulled from bases all over the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan for 179 days.  These 179-day deployments have deeper effects that go 
beyond negative efficiency on the supply-chain process.  When a CCO deploys to the 
AOR, a void is left at the CCO’s home station, where commanders and civilian leaders 
must make organizational decisions regarding workload distribution.  Experienced 
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workers are usually burdened with heavier workloads, which results in inadequate 
training time for inexperienced workers (i.e., junior officers and enlisted personnel, 
enlisted cross-trainees, and civilian interns).  In addition to the burden placed on home-
station personnel, the emotional element of a deployment must be considered.  Families 
suffer when the CCO is away from home for 179 days.  The tour lengths and lack of 
respite from the deployment cycle eventually take a toll and, to avoid further 
deployments, experienced officers and enlisted personnel choose to either separate from 
the AF or retire.  Along with inadequate training and emotional burdens, deploying CCOs 
to the AOR also has significant costs associated with training, equipping, and 
transporting personnel.   
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this study is as follows: What is the reachback 
viability for USAFCENT GPC purchases?  From this primary question, we developed 
secondary questions to assist us in determining the viability of reachback methods. 
1. Is the U.S. military currently employing reachback for contingencies? 
2. What percentage of GPC purchases in the AOR are provided by U.S. vendors and 
suppliers? 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of reachback? 
4. What would a USAFCENT personnel reduction model look like?  
F. METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter I, we introduce our study by providing its purpose, underlying research 
questions, and significance. 
In Chapter II, we provide extensive background information and an in-depth 
literature review on the concept of reachback; this includes a brief look at current 
reachback support for the four branches of the U.S. military.  We then analyze and 
critique the 2011 RAND Corporation report Air Force Contingency Contracting: 
Reachback and Other Opportunities for Improvement (Ausink, Castaneda, & Chenoweth, 
2011).  We conclude Chapter II by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
reachback, and by analyzing contracting officers’ general concerns about this concept. 
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Our intent is to look at both sides of this issue because our support of reachback might 
draw criticism from skeptics who believe reachback will cause commanders in the AOR 
to lose control of and accountability for the supply chain. 
After we present our literature review, we focus Chapter III on presenting data 
and current metrics from the USAFCENT contracting offices.  Through several graphs, 
we display total contract actions, dollars obligated, GPC dollars obligated, and U.S. 
dollars obligated.  We also look at the current USAFCENT organizational structure and 
the difference between operational and functional chains of command.   
In Chapter IV, we first provide an interpretation of the data presented in Chapter 
III.  This includes the methodology we used to calculate the workload ratios that led to 
the development of our models.  Next, we discuss the assumptions and constraints that 
must be considered before making any conclusions based on the models.  Finally, we 
present potential reduction models using 25%, 50%, and 75% GPC action reductions.  
Our intent is to support answers only to our primary research question: Is reachback 
viable for GPC purchases?  We do not make any recommendations on how to change the 
current USAFCENT organizational structure. 
In Chapter V, we provide our overall conclusion regarding the viability of GPC 
reachback.  Before using resources to create a reachback cell, USAFCENT leaders must 
consider leadership and management issues, along with any relevant research (e.g., this 
project or the RAND Corporation report).  We provide recommendations for further 
research on the subject.  For example, the AF provides the majority of its CCOs to the 
Joint Support Theater Contracting Command (JSTCC) in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Future 
research can determine if reachback support can help eventually reduce the number of 
CCOs in theater.  
G. SUMMARY 
In Chapter I, we provided a basic roadmap for our study and for the topics we 
examine in each chapter of our study.  The background section identified what reachback 
is and how the CCO functions in the supply-chain model.  In the purpose section, we 
identified why we conducted the current research and its significance. In the research 
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section, we described the deeper effects of conducting reachback support—for example, 
home-station void, family issues, and costs.  The research questions we outlined guided 
our study. In the methodology section, we described the layout of the different chapters 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose in this chapter is to provide a greater understanding of reachback, 
analyze how current reachback initiatives assist Department of Defense (DoD) 
operations, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of reachback, along with 
common concerns regarding reachback support.  We begin the chapter with a brief 
history of U.S. government reachback support.  This history does not necessarily pertain 
to military operations, but rather to any form of reachback support.  Next, we look at 
current DoD reachback initiatives, such as the Army Contracting Command (ACC) 
Reachback Division in Rock Island, Illinois. Then we analyze the RAND Corporation’s 
report (Ausink, Castaneda, & Chenoweth, 2011), on AF contingency contracting 
reachback.  This report is the most thorough research done to date on the subject of 
contingency contracting reachback.  After discussing the RAND Corporation’s report, we 
break down the four phases of contingency contracting, the Phase Zero concept, and 
reachback support’s role in assisting in these phases.  Finally, we present the advantages 
and disadvantages of contracting reachback support.  These advantages and 
disadvantages cover a broad range of ideas and concepts, such as decentralization, 
strategic purchasing, leadership and control issues, and hours of operation. 
B. U.S. GOVERNMENT REACHBACK SUPPORT 
1. Department of Defense 
Only one document at the DoD level addresses reachback.  JP 4-10, Operational 
Contract Support (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2008) establishes doctrine for planning, 
conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and contractor 
management functions in support of joint operations.  This publication (U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, 2008) provides standardized guidance and information related to integrating 




different, but directly related, functions; and provides a basic discussion of contracting 
command and control organizational options; however, it is only applicable to 
contingency operations. 
There are four instances of the word reachback in the document. The first 
mention states that the Army has reachback capability but this mention does not provide 
any additional information about the Army’s use of this capability.  The next three 
mentions appear as checklist questions pertaining to legal and contracting reachback.   
JP 4-10 does not specifically call for a reachback cell to be established by any 
service or joint effort.  It focuses on questions leaders should answer while planning, but 
mentions nothing about implementation (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2008).  This 
document provided no relevant information for our research.   
2. Military Branches 
The Navy does not employ the reachback concept in its deployment procurement.  
It uses existing husbandry contracts that are set up at existing ports to supply the goods 
and services it needs. 
The Marines employ reachback based on the region in which a deployed unit is 
stationed.  Each home-station Marine unit is supported by a Regional Contracting 
Organization (RCO).  When the unit deploys, the same RCO supports it for commodities 
and services that it cannot contract for in the deployed environment. 
Currently, the AF does not perform any contingency contracting reachback 
specific for USAFCENT personnel.   It does supply personnel who work at the Rock 
Island Arsenal, but these personnel fall under Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command (JTSCC) and not under USAFCENT.  
The Army employs reachback from the Rock Island Contracting Center (RICC), 
located on Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. The division currently has “four branches 
handling Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar, and transportation” (Adrian, 2010).  The 




Brigade, the deployed brigade in Kuwait.  In 2008, the division entered into a 
memorandum of agreement to supply contracting support to U.S. Central Command’s 
JTSCC. 
3. Joint Commands 
JTSCC, which employs CCOs from all military services, currently receives 
contracting reachback support from Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.  The reachback center 
is currently divided in two different sections: complex and non-complex.  The mission of 
the reachback support program is to have personnel contract standard procurements with 
vendors based primarily in the United States.  This frees deployed contracting personnel 
to work directly with deployed warfighters to award requirements in the AOR (Berns, 
2010).  The contingency contracting officers in theater award contracts mainly from the 
host nation and other vendors as required. 
The difference between the two sections is based on the dollar amount only.  The 
non-complex section is responsible for stateside commodities in the range of $1 to $6.5 
million.  If the commodity can be bought using the procedures in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR, 2011) part 13.500, the maximum amount increases to $12 million.  
Anything over $6.5 million (or $12 million for commodities under FAR part 13.500) is 
executed by the complex section. 
4. Other Reachback Initiatives 
The concept of reachback is not unique to contracting alone.  Other organizations 
perform their own type of reachback under different names, but the concept is the same. 
a. Air Force Distributed Common Ground System 
The AF Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) is a series of five 
interconnected clearinghouses of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  These 
clearinghouses practice a form of reachback. Information gathered in the AOR is 
transmitted electronically to ground stations located in the U.S.  The information, raw or 
processed, is then sent to commanders in the field (Tirpak, 2009). 
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b. Army Human Terrain System 
The Army Human Terrain System (HTS; The Reachback Research Center, 
n.d.) is an initiative to provide sociocultural teams to deployed units that help the units 
understand the local population and use that understanding in the military decision-
making process.  The majority of these initiatives are done in the deployed environment 
but are supported by the two Reachback Research Center (RRC) cells located in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, and Newport News, Virginia.  These cells enable supported 
commanders to access additional analysts who have a wide body of academic knowledge.  
By design, the RRC is an extension of the deployed teams. Key to this support concept 
are close coordination and collaboration regarding the development of requests for 
research. 
C. ANALYSIS OF RAND REPORT ON AIR FORCE CONTRACTING 
REACHBACK SUPPORT 
1. Background of Study 
In 2008, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Contracting (SAF/AQC) asked the RAND Corporation (Ausink et al., 2011) to perform a 
study examining reachback capabilities. The main objective of their research was to 
determine if reachback services could alleviate the deployment stress on the contracting 
career field, which had just gone to a 1:1 dwell in response to an SAF/AQC memo 
(Correll, 2008).  The final report, published in 2011, is currently the most comprehensive 
study done on the subject of reachback (Ausink et al., 2011). 
In their approach to the study, the RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) first 
utilized nine years’ worth of CCO after-action reports (AARs) in order to learn what 
CCOs actually do in theater.  Second, they conducted a series of focus groups in which 
they interviewed recently deployed CCOs, civilian and military leaders, and members of 
contracting organizations that have used reachback services.  Finally, they analyzed data 
from the Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS), which is the system Joint 
Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) used to capture spend metrics for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  The data were 
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used in determining reachback impact on different categories of purchases (i.e., 
commodities, services, construction, and various dollar thresholds; Ausink et al., 2011).     
2. Results of the Study 
After the intensive study, the RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) concluded 
that CCO challenges can be mitigated through reachback services; however, their 
conclusions called mostly for changes to procedures and policies.  They identified five 
challenges and provided recommendations for each (see Table 1).  
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) determined that reachback has 
potential, but only provided two overall recommendations for the AF. First, they 
recommended that the AF refine purchase categories because they believed that much of 
the data overlapped various categories.  This recommendation is important in determining 
whether the purchase was made during the buildup or the sustainment phase.  The RAND 
researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) suggested that reachback has the most potential during 
the sustainment phase.  Their second recommendation was that the AF analyze the 
experiences of former and current reachback organizations, primarily the JTSCC 
reachback cell in Rock Island, Illinois.     
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Table 1.   Challenges and Recommendations for Contracting Procedures (From Ausink et 
al.,2011) 
Challenge Recommendation 
1) Facilitating better requirements and 
Statement of Work (SOW) 
development. Inexperienced customers 
in theater do not know how to write 
SOWs or requirements and CCOs end 
up carrying the burden. 
Create a 24-hour help desk to assist customers 
develop SOWs and requirements in 
conjunction with the JCC Handbook appendix 
for SOW checklist and templates.  Service 
would be similar to Air Force Civil Engineer 
Support Agency (AFCESA) civil-engineer 
hotline 
2) Consolidating requirements into 
fewer contracts. Most contracts 
written in fiscal year 2008 were single-
use purchase orders. 
Create a theater-wide database of contracts for 
CCOs.  They can use this database to see what 
contracts have already been awarded for 
similar purchases.  Basically, more theater-
wide Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) 
and Indefinite Delivery-Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQs) should be created for consolidating 
requirements 
3) Revising deployment policies. RAND 
focus groups stated many of the 
contracting duties are mundane tasks 
that prevent experienced CCOs from 
doing “big” contracts. 
Allow low-grade personnel and other career 
fields, such as 63A Program Managers, to 
handle positions where tasks do not require a 
warrant.  This increases the deployment pool.  
Also consider allowing DoD civilians to 
deploy to low-threat areas.  
4) Reviewing personnel allocations and 
revising as needed. Some offices have 
too few personnel and some have too 
many.  Some offices have sections with 
too many inexperienced people 
compared to sister sections. 
Create a tracking tool that analyzes CCO 
workload metrics.  Personnel allocation can be 
managed using this tool.  Also, negotiate with 
other services to provide more bodies for joint 
positions. 
5) Clarifying the roles of other 
personnel in the contracting process. 
CCOs can spend time doing tasks 
outside their responsibilities when 
these tasks have been assigned to 
Contracting Officer Representatives 
(CORs) and Quality Assurance 
Evaluators (QAEs). 
Training should be provided to the customers 
on what the roles and responsibilities are for 
administering a contract.  Properly trained or 
experienced customers should serve as CORs 
or QAEs. 
Note. We created this table using information found in the RAND research report  
3. Suggested Future Research 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) proposed five areas in which further 
research could be done because these topics were out of their project’s scope. 
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a. Joint & Command and Control Issues 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) stated that more than 70% of 
the AF CCOs are currently in joint billets.  As of September 1, 2011, that number had 
dropped to 53% due to the drawdown in Iraq and the increased support of the ACC 
providing qualified Army CCOs.  In the RAND focus group panels, members stated that 
it was important for the commander to know the CCO worked for him or her.  We came 
across similar command and control issues as part of the 2011 USAFCENT Procurement 
Management Assessment (PMA) team.  According to the 2011 USAFCENT PMA report 
(Benivegna, Ackiss, Balaji, & Michael, 2011), commanders of the various expeditionary 
contracting squadrons (ECONS) stated that they answer to the Air Expeditionary Wing 
(AEW) Commander, but they wondered who the reachback cell would answer to?  
Because our project deals only with USAFCENT GPC purchases, we address our 
solutions to these command and control questions.  We do not address the joint billet 
capabilities because our project scope is limited to USAFCENT. 
b. Policy Issues 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) stated that certain dollar 
thresholds apply to overseas contingency purchases versus normal stateside purchases.  
Would the reachback cell be subject to overseas contingency thresholds or stateside 
thresholds?  Table 2 states the current thresholds according to FAR (2011) parts 2.101, 
13.201, and 13.500. 
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$150,000 $300,000 $1,000,000 
Test Program for 
certain commercial 
items 
$6,500,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 
Currently, there is much debate, even in theater, on which thresholds are 
applicable to certain acquisitions.  If a CCO deployed to Qatar makes a micro-purchase 
with a stateside vendor, is the threshold $15,000 or $30,000?  An argument could be 
made that because the dollars obligated are going to a stateside vendor, the threshold is 
$15,000.  Another argument is that the physical action of awarding the contract is done in 
a foreign contingency operation, so the threshold should be $30,000.   
JTSCC has implemented a policy that deals with this situation and could 
prove useful for a similar USAFCENT model.  All requirements of $15,000 and below 
(i.e., the stateside contingency micro-purchase threshold) are vetted through a reachback 
cell liaison assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The reachback cell in Illinois, which has 
declared contingency obligation authority, completes the purchase order unless they 
deem that the purchase can be made in Iraq or Afghanistan.  We review this model in 
greater detail in Chapter IV, along with our recommendations of what the USAFCENT 
reachback model should look like.  
                                                 
1 If the purchase is subject to the Davis Bacon Act, then the micro purchase threshold for stateside 
contingency is $3,000. 
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c. Collateral Impact 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) questioned how using 
reachback cells will affect the training and development of contracting officers.  They 
asked whether the reachback cell should have only experienced personnel with previous 
deployment experience.  The small-dollar acquisition branch of the RICC currently 
employs “C”-coded AF assets.  These are personnel who are unable to deploy due to 
medical reasons.  The current experience levels range from Acquisition Professional 
Development Program (APDP) Level III captains (O3s) and AF 7-Level NCOs (E5-E7s) 
to brand new airmen fresh from tech school.  Because our project is limited to GPC 
purchases, this type of acquisition is low-density and doesn’t require the experience level 
a major source selection would. 
d. Reachback Cell Location and Personnel Pool 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) addressed the challenge of 
having multiple reachback cells and identifying locations for those cells.  The current 
JTSCC reachback cell in Illinois only supports JTSCC contracts.  Our scope is focused 
only on USAFCENT contracting and we present a model of our reachback cell in Chapter 
IV.  In the USAFCENT PMA report (Benivegna, et al., 2011), CCOs voiced concerns 
that the reachback cell would be disconnected from the deployed troops and asked what 
the working hours would look like.   
e.  Resources 
Resources are one of the main concerns when a new military organization 
is created.  What equipment is needed? How much building space is required? What will 
the communications capability be?  Currently, the JTSCC reachback cell uses the same 
database as all the RCCs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The database keeps them up-to-date on 
requirements and allows in-theater users to see the status of their purchase orders.  
Similarly, USAFCENT is moving all the ECONS to a new online contracting writing tool 
called Electronic Acquisition Services Environment (EASE).  This software will allow a 
reachback cell located anywhere in the world to communicate freely with CCOs in 
theater. 
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D. PHASES OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
To better understand how reachback could work and when its planning should 
occur, we first analyze the four contingency contracting support phases (Figure 1) as 
described by the Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook (DCCH; Yoder et al., 
2010).  
 
Figure 1.   Phases of Contingency Contracting  (From Yoder et al., 2010) 
1. Phase 1: Mobilization and Initial Deployment 
As discussed in the DCCH, Phase 1 is intended to last through the first 30–45 
days of the deployment.  This period includes extremely high operations tempo, 
confusion, and controlled chaos (Yoder et al., 2010).  This is where CCOs spend the 
majority of their time procuring items necessary to build an effective contracting office 
for the mass influx of requirements from other units.  CCOs must also develop a priority 
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list with the mission commander for the most essential items necessary to support the 
troops on the ground.  Every unit will declare their requirements are mission critical, so it 
is imperative for the CCO to make this priority list with the mission commander.  
Typically, the top priority is contracting for basic life-support services for the troops 
(Yoder et al., 2010). The CCO must also start developing relationships with support 
agencies such as the embassy, qualified and competent contractors, the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA), and local interpreters.  CORs from each unit must be 
assigned so that once contracts are in place, the CCO need not spend time doing quality 
assurance surveillance on the contractor (Yoder et al., 2010). 
The majority of Phase 1 is planned while on the home station and then executed 
once the unit hits the ground in the deployed theater.  This phase does not have much 
need for reachback services because of the “fog-of-war” element unique to each deployed 
location.  Only CCOs who have adequate communication capabilities should call their 
stateside contracting units for advice.  Ideally, a qualified Tier 2 CCO as described by the 
Yoder Three-Tier model (Yoder, 2004) should support Phase 1 tasks.  Qualified Tier 2 
CCOs are considered to be senior enlisted personnel, mid-to junior-grade officers, and 
GS-11+ 1102 civilians, all with APDP Level I or II certification.  These individuals 
should be able to fulfill the Phase 1 tasks without the assistance of reachback services. 
2. Phase 2: Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and 
Integration 
Phase 2 (better known as the buildup phase) is characterized by the reception and 
bed-down of the main body of deploying forces (Yoder et al., 2010).  CCOs generally 
begin receiving additional contracting personnel to assist with requirements and qualified 
CORs may arrive from other units to assist with contract quality assurance.  Basic life-
support requirements are still the top priority, but the CCO must start planning to support 
command and control procedures.  CCOs establish methods for units to submit 
requirements, create a formal purchase request (PR) approval process in conjunction with 
the finance unit, and start attending all meetings in which contracting or business advice 
is needed.  BPAs are critical in this stage because units start submitting recurring 
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requirements, and CCOs need a contract vehicle capable of supporting high-demand 
items. 
Reachback during this phase may also be impractical due to the high operations 
tempo.  CCOs still have to manage the chaos while continuing to train units on the 
contracting procedures.  Depending on the additional contracting personnel who come 
during Phase 2, more experienced CCOs may have to train the less experienced CCOs, 
such as Tier 1 CCOs, as defined in the Yoder Three-Tier Model (Yoder, 2004).  If 
adequate communications, such as e-mail and phone, are established, as well as an Army 
Post Office (APO) postal address, CCOs may seek assistance from home-station 
contracting units for purchasing requirements available only in the U.S.  Home-station 
units can also conduct market research and help coordinate shipping and delivery with 
stateside vendors.  However, reachback services should not be relied upon during Phase 
2. 
3. Phase 3: Sustainment 
The DCCH considers Phase 3 to be the period when contracting support is needed 
from the end of buildup until the redeployment of forces begins (Yoder et al., 2010).  
According to the definition in the DCCH, the current state of USAFCENT contracting 
operations in Southwest Asia is considered to be in Phase 3.  The contracting mission 
now focuses on supporting combat operations, stability and reconstruction operations, 
and sustainment operations.  During this phase, forward operating bases (FOBs) or 
enduring operating bases (EOBs) tend to resemble the similar command structure of 
home-station bases.  Within the USAFCENT AOR, EOBs and FOBs have the typical 
wing-group-squadron command chart and all units have fully operational buildings or 
designated areas complete with communications, security, engineering, contracting, and 
services support.  Supply and logistics chains between the U.S. and the AOR become 
more efficient every day.  During this phase, the CCOs shift focus and become business 
advisors for the wing or base commander and help make the supply chain even more 
efficient.  CCOs must begin to achieve cost reductions through competition or by 
establishing long-term contracts, such as IDIQs.  The DCCH suggests CCOs begin 
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achieving economies of scale by consolidating requirements where possible and 
mitigating government risk on contracts (Yoder et al., 2010).  CCOs rotate in and out of 
the AOR in this phase, so accurate and up-to-date continuity of past, current, and future 
contracts is critical for the success of contracting support.  As stated earlier, CCOs should 
treat Phase 3 activities as similar to home-station activities, only with a higher operations 
tempo. 
Phase 3 is the perfect time to implement reachback strategies, especially in a 
mature theater such as Qatar, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates.  As we show in 
Chapter III, many of the requirements during Phase 3 are purchases at or below the SAT.  
CCOs can minimize their workload and stress levels by vetting these requirements back 
to a reachback cell that has the contracting know-how to effectively and efficiently 
purchase these requirements.  CCO deployments are much more important during Phase 
1 and 2 operations, when compared to Phase 3, during which reachback becomes more of 
an option (Ausink et al., 2011).  During Phase 3 operations, Tier 1 and Tier 2 CCOs can 
be utilized based on the complexity of the requirements (Yoder, 2004).  Tier 1 CCOs can 
easily do the micro-purchases and GPC-type purchasing in a reachback cell rather than in 
a deployed theater, where Tier 2 CCOs can focus on the role of business advisor and 
gaining cost reductions and efficiencies.  Once a Tier 1 CCO gains adequate training and 
experience and moves into Tier 2, then he or she can deploy to the AOR as a business 
advisor.  
4. Phase 4: Termination and Redeployment 
Phase 4 is defined by significant pressure and urgency to send the troops home 
(Yoder et al., 2010).  The 2011 drawdown in Iraq can be categorized as a Phase 4 
operation.  New logistical requirements, such as packing, crating and freight services, and 
air transportation for troops, go through the contracting office (if U.S. Transportation 
Command [USTRANSCOM] is not providing this service; Yoder et al., 2010).  The 
CCO’s focus shifts mainly to the responsibility of terminating existing contracts and of 
closing out and staging expired contracts.  During this time, contractors may begin 
submitting claims for unsettled invoices, and this falls under the purview of the CCO.  
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The CCO must also ensure that life-support services are in place until the last troop 
leaves the theater.  CCOs can expect amounts of controlled chaos similar to Phase 1, 
especially when attempting to recover completed materiel receiving reports from end 
users.  
Reachback services can be used for closeout and claims procedures.  During 
Phase 3, contract closeouts should be an ongoing responsibility of the CCO, but if the 
CCO does not have the time to perform such tasks, closeout duties can be delegated to 
Tier 1-type CCOs in a reachback cell.  Once the declared contingency is over and all 
troops—including the CCO—have left the theater, a reachback cell can assume the 
responsibility of handling any claims made by contractors, payments on overdue 
invoices, and the staging of closed-out contracts. 
5. Yoder Phase Zero Operations: Planning and Exercise Cycle  
Contingency contracting should be an integral part of pre-deployment planning 
and should be included in the combatant commander’s (COCOM) strategic operations 
plan (OPLAN; Yoder, 2004).  Yoder theorized the Phase Zero concept as a precursor to 
the existing four phases detailed by the DCCH.  In his report Phase Zero Operations for 
Contingency and Expeditionary Contracting—Keys to Fully Integrating Contracting into 
Operational Planning and Execution (2010), Yoder recommends that Congress establish 
and fund Tier 3 (Yoder, 2004) Integrated Planner and Executer (IPE) billets and positions 
within each unified combatant command and military service component.  Once the IPE 
position is funded, Congress must develop a strategic-level Contract Support Integration 
Plan (CSIP) for all OPLAN and contingency plans (CONPLAN).  The purpose of the 
CSIP is to give contracting a seat at the strategic-level table.  Yoder also recommends 
that Phase Zero IDIQ and multiple-award contracts (MAC) should be established so that 
when the troops deploy, requirements can be procured with greater effectiveness and 
efficiency (Yoder, 2010). 
A reachback cell could benefit this stage by establishing the MAC and IDIQ 
contracts specific to certain regions of the world where contingencies could occur.  The 
reachback cell would conduct all market research necessary to gain an understanding of 
 23
the supply-chain characteristics of each region (i.e., vendor base, shipping methods, 
security, etc.).  Once the contingency is declared and Phase 1 operations begin, the 
reachback cell can provide a Tier 2 CCO (as defined by Yoder, 2004) to procure the 
appropriate requirements and uphold the policies set forth by the IPE and COCOM.  
Once the contingency matures into Phase 3 operations, the reachback cell can provide 
additional support for sustainment.    
E. ADVANTAGES OF REACHBACK SUPPORT 
Army Major John M. Neal defined reachback as “the electronic ability to exploit 
organic and non-organic resources, capabilities and expertise, which by design are not 
located in theater” (Neal, 2000, p. 39).  Reachback provides commanders and leaders in 
theater with another tool to effectively complete the mission while reducing the risk of 
losing human and non-human assets.   
Reachback enhances the operational agility of the deployed unit by 
improving its access to timely and relevant information. … Telemedicine, 
the ability of remote doctors to consult specialists electronically, is a 
striking example of self-directed reachback.  Soon many units will have 
the ability to conduct similar self-directed reachback through their organic 
information systems. (Neal, 2000, p. 39) 
With the emergence of telecommunication resources such as e-mail, video-
teleconferencing (VTC), and Internet, commanders can increase the span of their control 
to areas of the globe well beyond their physical location.  In fact, with the resources 
currently owned by the AF and military as a whole, reachback support can be achieved 
without the procurement of additional technologies.   
Reachback is a way to centralize the execution of requirements and still achieve 
the commander’s vision.  One advantage of centralized execution is the uniformity of 
activities and effective control (MBA Knowledge Base, 2010).  In a contracting 
reachback scheme, requirements from the theater would be sent by the ECONS to a 
reachback cell as shown in Figure 2.  The reachback cell would now have the decision-
making authority on how best to procure the requirement (i.e., full and open competition, 
small business set-aside, sole source, GPC).  These requirements would be purchased in a 
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uniform manner since the CCOs at a reachback cell would be standardized in their 
training.  The reachback cell would also have one person in charge to ensure 
requirements are purchased properly and uniformly.  Another advantage of centralization 
is economies of scale which reduces duplication of work (MBA Knowledge Base, 2010).  
CCOs at a reachback cell could share their knowledge of requirements from all the 
USAFCENT contracting offices and determine what supplies are bought frequently.  The 
CCOs could then set up BPAs and IDIQs to gain cost savings.     
 
Figure 2.   Reachback Requirements Flow Chart 
For USAFCENT GPC purchases, centralization of Tier 1-level work (as defined 
by Yoder, 2004) will allow Tier 2 personnel in theater to focus on developing 
relationships with host-nation vendors.  According to Yoder’s model, Tier 2, also known 
as, leveraging contracting officers (LCOs) should engage with local and regional 
businesses.  “This level … includes leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local 
and regional economies in the contingent theater” (Yoder, 2004, p. 14). 
Developing local economies is integral to contracting’s mission and once a 
contingency has reached Phase 3 (Sustainment), CCOs should not have to waste valuable 
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man-hours procuring supplies from stateside vendors.  Decentralizing purchases not 
critical to the development of local economies can optimize the supply chain by allowing 
CCOs, at both ends of the chain, to interact and procure from geographically closer 
vendors. 
A second advantage to reachback is the concept of strategic purchasing or 
sourcing.  Strategic sourcing involves a firm’s decision to take a strategic approach to the 
selection of suppliers (Rendon, 2005).  According to Peter Kraljic (1983), sourcing 
strategies classify purchases by assessing the supply position in order to reduce supply 
weaknesses and efficiently use a company’s buying leverage.  Currently, USAFCENT 
contracting offices form a tactical buying unit where multiple personnel focus on short-
term, one-time buys.  These CCOs do not coordinate strategically to potentially save the 
AF taxpayer dollars.  A reachback cell can analyze the purchases made by all eight 
USAFCENT contracting offices and determine which similar products are consistently 
purchased across theater.  CCOs at a reachback cell would have intimate market 
knowledge of stateside vendors.  In addition, operating at a strategic level “inverts” 
tactical buying into strategic sourcing, as shown in Figure 3 (Moore, Baldwin, Camm, & 
Cook, 2002). 
 
Figure 3.   Strategic Model  (Moore et al., 2002) 
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Once these trends are discovered, the reachback cell can leverage its power as a 
buyer and achieve cost savings by making bulk purchase orders (Porter, 2008).  
According to the Joint-Applied MBA project called The Need for a Strategic Approach to 
Contingency Contracting (D’Angelo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2007), thorough spend-
analyses must integrate the Services’ network of supply chains with the geographical 
area, thus identifying areas in which to capture more value.  Unless the commanders from 
each USAFCENT contracting office coordinate and share their spend-data, it will be 
impossible to leverage buying power. 
Finally, one of the most important advantages for reachback is the reduction in 
deployed troops.  The RAND Corporation sponsored an analysis by Ausink et al. (2011) 
that used spend-data from Joint Contracting Command (now JTSCC) and developed a 
potential reduction of deployed AF CCOs based on fiscal year (FY) 2008 data (see Figure 
4).  According to RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011), 11 personnel could be reduced 
from the deployment pool based on the number of GPC actions in 2008.      
  
Figure 4.   Potential JCC-I/A Deployment Reductions (From Austink et al., 2011)  
Note: General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) 
 
Figure 5, reprinted from the RAND research report (Ausink et al., 2011), shows 
that in order for a 1:2 deployment dwell (six months deployed, one year at home) to exist, 
the number of deployed positions in the JCC would have to be reduced from 286 to 191.  
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The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) suggested taking the potential personnel 
reductions identified in Figure 4 and placing them into a reachback cell; however, 
because all these positions are joint billets, the AF does not have control of the joint 
manning document and some negotiating would have to be done (Ausink et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 5.   Deployment Reductions (From Ausink et al., 2011)  
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) also conducted focus groups with 
experienced CCOs to gain insight on the potential advantages of a reachback cell.  These 
CCOs stated that standardization and continuity of the workforce would be tremendous 
advantages.  Reachback cells would be repositories of expertise and a valuable training 
location for inexperienced CCOs (Ausink et al., 2011).  These experienced CCOs felt that 
placing civilians in a reachback cell and allowing them to administer long-term contracts 
would mean that rotational CCOs would not have to constantly re-learn the contract 
terms and conditions of these long-term contracts, which could frustrate the customer and 
contractor.  The reachback cell also provides a safe method to adequately train new 
CCOs on the high operations tempo of a deployed environment without the risk of 
dangerous hazards, such as insurgency or terrorism.      
F. CONCERNS, SUGGESTIONS, AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
REACHBACK SUPPORT 
Contracting reachback is still in its infancy and there is no empirical data on its 
disadvantages.  To complete this section of our study, we relied mainly on subjective data 
gathered from the USAFCENT PMA report (Benivegna et al., 2011) and the RAND 
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report (Ausink et al., 2011).  We also discuss the primary disadvantage of reachback; 
being separated from the customer (Cascio, 2000).  
The USAFCENT PMA team (Benivegna et al., 2011) collected information about 
reachback.  As part of the data collection for the PMA report, the team asked currently 
deployed CCOs, ECONS commanders, and mission support commanders about their 
perception of reachback.  They offered many concerns about and suggestions for 
implementing a reachback cell. 
One of the CCOs’ major concerns, noted in the PMA report (Benivegna et al., 
2011), was the hours of operation.  Many personnel stated the reachback cell needed to 
be manned 24 hours a day.  Others stated that the reachback cell’s hours needed to match 
those of the deployed location it was supporting (Benivegna et al., 2011).    
ECONS commanders conveyed concern over losing control and accountability of 
items purchased at a reachback cell (Benivegna et al., 2011). The commanders stated that 
they might lose the capability to quickly find the status of a purchase if their respective 
wing leadership inquired about it.   
Everyone interviewed by the PMA team expressed how important it would be for 
a reachback cell to take into account unique issues at each ECONS location.  For 
example, some Middle Eastern countries do not allow items from prohibited countries.  
All who participated in the survey also expressed concern that losing personnel for the 
reachback cell could affect their current mission. 
CCOs and ECONS commanders both suggested establishing an online tool to 
track status for all requirements (Benivegna et al., 2011).  This tool would allow any 
member from the deployed location to get online and view any purchase made by the 
reachback cell.  The last suggestion noted in the PMA report was that each location 
would need a liaison to coordinate shipping and receiving information. 
The RAND researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) included a table in their report that 




Figure 6.   Potential Downsides of Using Reachback (From Ausink et al., 2011) 
Not being located with your customer is the primary disadvantage of reachback.  
According to Wayne Cascio (2000) in “Managing a Virtual Workplace,” the major 
disadvantage of distance is the lack of physical interaction with its associated verbal and 
non-verbal cues.  He also noted that virtual workplaces lack the synergies that can result 
from face-to-face communication.  This lack of interaction can raise issues of trust within 
the team (Cascio, 2000). 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided a background and literature review on current 
reachback concepts and research and on the applicability of reachback to the different 
phases of contingency contracting.  In this chapter, we began to answer our primary 
research question—What is the reachback viability for USAFCENT GPC purchases?—
by focusing on two secondary questions: (1) Is the U.S. military currently employing 
reachback for contingencies? and (2) What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
reachback?  In order to tackle the secondary questions, we first discussed different 
reachback initiatives conducted by branches of the U.S. military.  The AF currently uses 
reachback services for civil engineering support through the AFCESA Reachback Center.  
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AF also employs reachback capability with remotely piloted aircraft (RPA).  While 
sitting in a trailer at a classified location in the Nevada desert, pilots control RPA 
thousands of miles away and maintain combat effectiveness while protecting human 
capital and saving deployment and training costs of the pilots.  The Marine Corps uses 
contracting reachback through regional support.  Each base is assigned to a region, 
similar to how a USAF base is assigned to a Major Command (MAJCOM).  These 
regions provide support to CCOs from that region during contingency operations. 
Next, we analyzed the 2011 RAND report (Ausink et al., 2011) on AF 
contingency contracting.  As mentioned previously, this is the most comprehensive study 
to date on the concept of AF contingency contracting reachback support.  Then, we 
discussed the four phases of contingency contracting, as defined by the DCCH (Yoder et 
al., 2010), and how reachback could support each phase.  We also discussed the Phase 
Zero concept introduced by Yoder (2004) and how his Three-Tier model works.  Finally, 
we presented the advantages disadvantages, and concerns of creating a reachback cell.   
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III. PRESENTATION OF USAFCENT ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND SPEND DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the USAFCENT organizational chart, the 
spend-data metrics for the USAFCENT contracting offices, and the spend-data metrics 
for the RICC.  In Section B, we discuss the current USAFCENT organizational chart, 
CCO authorizations, and the current process for purchasing in theater. In Section C, we 
present the data in terms of total dollars obligated, total GPC dollars obligated, total 
contract actions, and total GPC contract actions.  This information is important because it 
shows what percentage of each unit’s purchases is accomplished using the GPC.  In 
Section D, we compare similar spend-data from the RICC.  Because the RICC is an 
established reachback cell for JTSCC, we use their data as a benchmark for comparing 
actions per buyer between the RICC and USAFCENT.  In this chapter, we answer one of 
our secondary research questions: What percentage of GPC purchases in the AOR are 
provided by U.S. vendors/suppliers?   
B. USAFCENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
USAFCENT has organized its AEW into the same wing-group-squadron structure 
found on stateside bases (see Figure 7).  Each ECONS reports to its numbered 
expeditionary mission support group (EMSG), which in turn reports to the Expeditionary 
Wing.  The offices at Eskan Village, Saudi Arabia, and Thumrait, Oman, report to an air 
expeditionary group (AEG) that typically reports to an AEW located at another base.  
AEGs are not large enough to necessitate the full wing-group-squadron format.  This 
structure represents the operational chain of command.  Because contracting is a 
functional support career field, USAFCENT has also created a functional chain of 
command (see Figure 8).  The purpose of this chain is to provide contracting squadrons 
with policy oversight, contracting assistance, and all general functional guidance.  The 
commander of the USAFCENT contracting office (A7/K) does not have supervisory 
authority over the commanders of the contracting squadrons.  However, the A7/K does 
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determine how incoming CCOs are apportioned to each squadron based on manning 
documents.  The A7/K office at Shaw AFB, Sumter, South Carolina, has a forward-
deployed office called USAFCENT Forward (AFFOR) A7/K.  This office serves as the 
director of contracting’s representative in theater and delegates with Head of Contracting 
Activity (HCA) authority for any contract action above the contracting squadron 
commander’s authority.   
 
 
Figure 7.   USAFCENT Operational Structure 
 
 
Figure 8.   USAFCENT A7/K Functional Structure 
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C. USAFCENT CONTRACTING METRICS 
In this section, we analyze data that was previously collected by the USAFCENT 
A7/K office and USAFCENT PMA team (Al-Udeid Air Base Combined Air Operations 
Center [AUAB CAOC], personal communication, October 3, 2011).  The PMA team 
traveled to the four largest USAFCENT contracting squadrons from June 2–17, 2011, to 
assess the health and readiness of the squadrons as well as to conduct CCO interviews on 
various issues (Benivegna et al., 2011).  The squadrons the PMA team visited were the 
376th ECONS at Transit Center Manas, Kyrgyzstan; the 379th ECONS at Al-Udeid Air 
Base (AB), Qatar; the 380th ECONS at Al-Dhafra AB, UAE; and the 386th ECONS at 
Ali Al-Salem AB, Kuwait.  Due to time constraints, the team did not visit the contracting 
offices at Eskan Village, Saudi Arabia, and Thumrait, Oman (Benivegna et al., 2011).  
These offices, however, along with the other offices, submit monthly contracting metrics 
to the USAFCENT A7/K office.  The data is compiled by the USAFCENT AFFOR A7/K 
office located at Al-Udeid AB, Qatar, so that all the squadrons’ information is available 
on a single Excel spreadsheet (AUAB CAOC, personal communication, October 3, 
2011).  The data we received from the A7/K was open information with all personal 
identification removed.  We, the authors of this Joint-Applied Project, did not conduct 
any human subject research.  Therefore, Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was 
not needed.  
In the following sections, we analyze FY11 data. We present the larger squadrons 
in numerical order and conclude with the smaller contracting offices.  After the analysis 
of each location, we present overall USAFCENT metrics and how each individual 
squadron compares with the others.  All statistics and charts in this section were created 
from data provided by Major Tina Benivegna of the USAFCENT A7/K office (AUAB 
CAOC, personal communication, October 3, 2011).  We interpret the data in Chapter IV. 
  1. 376th ECONS, Transit Center, Manas, Kyrgyzstan 
The 376th ECONS, Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan, primarily supports the 
376th AEW units, which provide air combat power projection with tactical airlift and air 
refueling aircraft. Additionally, the wing serves as a hub for strategic airlift operations 
 34
and as an intermediate staging base for transiting personnel and equipment in support of 
operations in Afghanistan. The 376th ECONS also provides support to the Theater 
Security Cooperation Cell (TSCC) and the Civil Military Operation Office of 
Cooperation for Army Central Command for Humanitarian Assistance requirements 
(Benivegna et al., 2011). 
As of October 3, 2011, the 376th had six CCOs assigned to the squadron; those 
CCOs had awarded 2,292 contract actions for FY11.  Of those 2,292 actions, 557 were 
awarded using the GPC, which is 24.30% of total actions (see Figure 9).  The 376th 
obligated $40.78 million in FY11; $1.98 million of that amount was for GPC purchases 
(see Figure 10).  The total number of GPC dollars obligated by the 376th accounts for 
approximately 4.85% of their total dollars obligated for FY11.  As shown in Figure 11, 
the 376th spent 100% of its GPC dollars in the U.S.     
 
 




Figure 10.   376th Total Dollars Obligated 
 
 
Figure 11.   376th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
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2. 379th ECONS, Al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar  
The 379th ECONS supports a large composite flying wing, the 379th Air 
Expeditionary Wing, and its associate units.  The 379th AEW is one of the largest and 
most diverse overseas wings and has over 100 operational aircraft. The office provides 
more traditional commodity, construction, and complex services procurement support. 
However, a significant amount of contract support for the installation is provided via the 
Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, which the 379th ECONS helps oversee and 
facilitate. The ECONS also aids in sustainment of one significant tenant unit, the 1st 
Expeditionary Red Horse Group, which serves as the logistics hub to coordinate and 
supply the forward deployed civil engineer missions (Benivegna et al., 2011). 
As of October 3, 2011, the 379th had 22 CCOs assigned to the squadron.  This 
squadron is unique among the other USAFCENT squadrons because it has decentralized 
GPC holders.  This means trained cardholders in other units are authorized to make 
micro-purchases for their respective units under the supervision of a CCO. The 379th has 
awarded 3,298 contract actions for FY11. Of those contract actions 1,465 were awarded 
by CCOs using the GPC and 1,331 were awarded by the customer using decentralized 
GPC. Utilizing only the 379th’s CCO GPC data, 44.42% of total contract actions were 
GPC purchases (see Figure 12).  After including the decentralized purchases, the number 
increased to 84.78%.  The 379th obligated $66.72 million in FY11; $7.39 million of that 
amount was for CCO GPC purchases and $2.09 million was for customer decentralized 
GPC purchases (see Figure 13).  The total GPC dollars obligated by the 379th accounted 
for approximately 14.20% of its total dollars obligated for FY11.  As shown in Figure 14, 




Figure 12.   379th Total Contract Actions 
 




Figure 14.   379th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
3. 380th ECONS, Al-Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates 
Similar to Al-Udeid AB, the 380th ECONS, Al-Dhafra AB, supports a large 
flying wing. While the type of aircraft, size, and mission are much different from the 
379th AEW, the 380th ECONS supports a more traditional wing structure with primary 
customers residing in the EMSG. The 380th ECONS also supports one large tenant on 
the installation, the 363rd Training Group (Air Warfare Center). The 363rd’s primary 
mission is to conduct training exercises, which generates a substantial workload for the 
380th.  Additionally, the 380th supports the 60th Expeditionary Reconnaissance 
Squadron at Djibouti, the Army Patriot Battery, and a Navy detachment (Benivegna et 
al., 2011). 
As of October 3, 2011, the 380th had 11 CCOs assigned to the squadron, and 
those CCOs had awarded 2,583 contract actions for FY11.  Of those 2,583 actions, 1,530 
were awarded using the GPC, which is 59.23% of total actions (see Figure 15).  The 
380th obligated $44.06 million in FY11, $4.35 million of which was for GPC purchases 
(see Figure 16).  The total GPC dollars obligated by the 380th accounted for 
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approximately 9.88% of their total dollars obligated for FY11.  As shown in Figure 17, 
the total amount of 380th GPC dollars spent in the United States was 43.07%. 
 
 




Figure 16.   380th Total Dollars Obligated 
 
 
Figure 17.   380th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
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4. 386th ECONS, Ali Al-Salem Air Base, Kuwait 
The 386th ECONS, Ali Al-Salem AB, primarily supports the 386th AEW units, 
as well as the 386th AEG at Kuwait City International Airport. The 386th ECONS 
performs commodity purchasing to support detainee operations and a combat line-haul 
mission at Camp Arifjan and an Air Force Security Forces unit at another smaller 
location (Benivegna et al., 2011).  
As of October 3, 2011, the 386th had 11 CCOs assigned to the squadron; those 
CCOs had awarded 1,677 contract actions for FY11.  Of those 1,677 actions, 1,348 were 
awarded using the GPC, which is 80.38% of total actions (see Figure 18).  The 386th 
obligated $26.31 million in FY11, $3.53 million of which was for GPC purchases (see 
Figure 19).  The total GPC dollars obligated by the 386th accounted for approximately 
13.41% of the unit’s total dollars obligated for FY11. As shown in Figure 20, the total 
amount of 386th GPC dollars spent in the United States was 48.89%. 
 
 




Figure 19.   386th Total Dollars Obligated 
 
Figure 20.   386th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
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5. 64th Expeditionary Support Squadron/Contracting (ESS/CON), 
Eskan Village, Saudia Arabia 
The 64th AEG is an all-AF contingent located at Eskan Village with the primary 
mission of providing force protection support to the larger U.S. military training mission 
and the Office of Personnel Management–Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM–SANG) 
missions also operating out of Eskan Village.  The 64th ESS/CON executes contract 
actions in support of the units with the ESS, which includes the large security forces 
organization that protects Eskan Village (Michael, Mazur, Sackett, & Mahar, 2008). 
As of October 3, 2011, the 64th had two CCOs assigned to the office; those CCOs 
had awarded 432 contract actions for FY11.  Of those 432 actions, 252 were awarded 
using the GPC, which is 58.33% of total actions (see Figure 21).  The 64th obligated 
$4.58 million in FY11, $512,768 of which was for GPC purchases (see Figure 22).  The 
total GPC dollars obligated by the 64th accounted for approximately 11.19% of its total 
dollars obligated for FY11.  As shown in Figure 23, the total amount of 64th GPC dollars 




Figure 21.   64th Total Contract Actions 
 
 
Figure 22.   64th Total Dollars Obligated 
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Figure 23.   64th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
6. 405th Expeditionary Support Squadron/ECONS, Thumrait, Oman 
The 405th ESS/ECONS supports Salah Port Operations in Oman to move critical 
equipment into and out of theater, primarily mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) 
vehicles.  This is the second smallest office in terms of actions (behind the 64th at Eskan 
Village). 
As of October 3, 2011, the 405th had two CCOs assigned to the office; those 
CCOs had awarded 718 contract actions for FY11.  Of those 718 actions, 326 were 
awarded using the GPC, which is 45.40% of total actions (see Figure 24).  The 405th 
obligated $11.35 million in FY11, $764,273 of which was for GPC purchases (see Figure 
25).  The total GPC dollars obligated by the 405th accounted for approximately 6.73% of 
its total dollars obligated for FY11.  As shown in Figure 26, the total amount of 405th 




Figure 24.   405th Total Contract Actions 
 




Figure 26.   405th GPC Dollars Spent in the U.S. 
7. Total USAFCENT and Squadron Comparison 
In this section, we present the overall USAFCENT data and compare the 
squadrons to one another.  Overall, USAFCENT produced 11,000 actions for FY11.  Of 
those actions, 6,816 were executed using the GPC.  The GPC accounted for 61.96% of 
the total contract actions (see Figure 27).  The total dollar obligation for USAFCENT in 
FY11 was $193.81 million, $20.62 million of which was obligated using the GPC.  This 
accounts for 10.64% of all dollars obligated (see Figure 28).  The squadrons are 
compared in Table 3 by total actions, GPC actions, dollars obligated using GPC, and 






























376th ECONS $40,782,614.20 4.85% 2,292 24.30% 100.00%
379th ECONS $66,723,021.10 14.20% 3,298 84.78% 46.11%
380th ECONS  $44,058,831.62 9.88% 2,583 59.23% 43.07%
386th ECONS  $26,314,538.54 13.41% 1,677 80.38% 48.89%
64th ESS/ECONS   $4,581,469.62 11.19% 432 58.33% 38.09%












Figure 28.   USAFCENT Total Dollars Obligated 
8. Rock Island Contracting Center CCO Average Workload 
In this section, we present data provided by Maj Fred Lacey from the non-
complex reachback cell (Lacey, personal communication, October 14, 2011).  The non-
complex cell periodically analyzes its own data to determine the average number of 
actions per CCO.  As of September 17, 2011, the average number of monthly actions per 
CCO was 37.  This number is used in Chapter IV as a benchmark for a potential 
reachback cell minimum workload rate.    
 D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented the spend-data of the USAFCENT contracting 
offices and explained how the operational and functional chains of command operate.  
We answered one of our secondary research questions—What percentage of GPC 
purchases in the AOR are provided by U.S. vendors and suppliers?—by interpreting the 
spend-data.  We presented graphs that showed total contract actions, total contract actions 
using the GPC, total dollars obligated, total GPC dollars obligated, and total dollars 
obligated within the U.S. and the host nation.  These numbers are important for Chapter 
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IV, in which we create a potential reduction model for a potential reachback cell.  We 
concluded Chapter III by presenting the current workload rate from the RICC.  This data 
provided a useful benchmark statistic for use in calculating the required number of CCOs 
in a potential reachback cell.   
 
 51
IV. FINDINGS AND REACHBACK MODEL  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents our findings and reachback model.  In Section B, we 
provide an interpretation of the data presented in Chapter III.  After reading this section, 
readers will understand how we determined the correct manning levels to use for the 
potential reductions and the current monthly actions per contingency contracting officer 
(CCO).  In Section C, we first discuss the assumptions and constraints we used to 
develop the model; after that discussion, readers should know the limitations of the model 
and its potential issues.  AF leaders may have to consider these limitations when 
determining the viability of the reachback model.  Next, we present the methodology we 
used to develop the model based on our assumptions and constraints.  In the final part of 
Section C, we provide interpretations of the model so that readers will understand the 
potential reachback viability and how the research begins to answer our primary research 
question.    
B. INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
In this section, we provide an interpretation of the data we presented in Chapter 
III.  We observe each squadron’s actions and the actions per CCO.  While it is important 
to track the number of dollars obligated within the host nation and U.S., for the purposes 
of our research, we observed only contract actions for the following reason:  One contract 
action could be for a multi-million dollar award, whereas ten GPC actions could 
hypothetically total $150,000 if they were purchased in the U.S. under CONUS 
thresholds.  The total dollars obligated for contract actions may not indicate the 
squadron’s true workload.  We now discuss each of the ECONS we studied.   
1. 376th ECONS  
According to the current manning, the 376th ECONS has six CCOs assigned.  
This includes one chief of contracting and five buyers.  One of the CCOs has the 
additional duty of superintendent; however, this position is still primarily a buyer.  The 
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chief of contracting is the only position that does not regularly award 
contracts/modifications, so we must assume that the contract actions are made by the five 
CCOs.  The total actions for FY11, according to Table 3 (Chapter III), were 2,292, which 
is 458.4 actions per buyer.  This equals 38.20 actions per CCO per month; however, this 
represents all contract actions, such as construction, services, purchase orders, and 
modifications.  Figure 9 (Chapter III) shows that the 376th performed 557 contract 
actions using the GPC, which equals approximately 9.28 actions per CCO per month.  
We also know from Figure 11 that 100% of the GPC dollars obligated were spent with 
U.S. vendors, so all 557 GPC actions were done in the U.S.  This particular location is the 
only squadron in USAFCENT where 100% of the GPC dollars were spent in the U.S., 
because Kyrgyzstani companies do not accept the GPC (Benivegna et al., 2011).  They 
accept only cash and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT).  All other squadrons are located in 
mature contracting environments where using GPC with local vendors is possible.     
2. 379th ECONS 
According to the current manning, the 379th ECONS has 22 CCOs assigned.  
This includes one squadron commander, one superintendent, four flight commanders, and 
16 buyers.  This squadron is the largest in USAFCENT in terms of size, dollars obligated, 
and actions.  The commander, superintendent, and flight commanders do not regularly 
perform contract awards/modifications, so we must assume that the contract actions are 
performed by the 16 CCOs.  This is the only ECONS where the flight commanders are 
used primarily for review purposes and not for the awarding of contracts. Therefore, they 
are not used in the model as CCOs.  If they are used in the future, the actions per buyer 
would decrease.  The total actions for FY11, according to Table 3, were 3,298 which is 
206.13 actions per buyer.  This equals 17.18 contract actions per buyer per month.  As in 
the 376th, these 17.18 actions represent all contract actions, including GPC purchases.  
Figure 12 shows that the 379th ECONS performed 1,465 contract actions using the GPC, 
which equals approximately 7.63 GPC actions per CCO per month.  As mentioned in 
Chapter III, the 379th also has decentralized GPC holders in other squadrons.  Figure 12 
shows that the decentralized GPC holders performed 1,331 actions.  Because ECONS 
CCOs provide supervisory oversight on these purchases, the total GPC actions 
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awarded/supervised by the squadron add up to 1,465+1,331, which equals 2,796.  This 
would equal 14.56 GPC actions per CCO per month had the 379th kept these actions in-
house.  By decentralizing, the 379th ECONS is able to reduce their GPC workload by 
6.93 GPC actions per CCO per month.  
3. 380th ECONS 
According to the current manning, the 380th ECONS has 11 CCOs assigned.  
This includes one squadron commander, one superintendent, and three flight 
commanders.  The squadron commander and superintendent are the only positions that do 
not regularly award contracts/modifications, so we must assume that the contract actions 
are made by the nine CCOs.  The total actions for FY11, according to Table 3, were 
2,583, which is 287 actions per buyer.  This equals 23.92 actions per CCO per month; 
however, this represents all contract actions, such as construction, services, purchase 
orders, and modifications, which is similar to the previously mentioned squadrons.  
Figure 15 shows that the 380th performed 1,530 contract actions using the GPC, which 
equals approximately 14.17 actions per CCO per month.   
4. 386th ECONS 
According to the current manning, the 386th ECONS has 11 CCOs assigned.  
This includes one squadron commander, one superintendent, and two flight commanders.  
The squadron commander and superintendent are the only positions that do not regularly 
award contracts/modifications, so we must assume that the contract actions are by the 
nine CCOs.  The total actions for FY11, according to Table 3, were 1,677, which is 
186.33 actions per buyer.  This equals 15.53 actions per CCO per month; however, this 
represents all contract actions, such as construction, services, purchase orders, and 
modifications, which is similar to the previously mentioned squadrons.  Figure 18 shows 
that 386th performed 1,348 contract actions using the GPC, which equals 12.48 actions 
per CCO per month.  This means the average CCO at 386th ECONS spends 
approximately 80.36% of his or her time doing micro-purchases; this is the highest ratio 
of GPC actions to Total Actions in USAFCENT AOR. 
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5. Eskan Village 
According to the current manning, Eskan Village has two CCOs assigned.  One 
CCO is designated the chief of contracting, but both personnel perform contract awards 
and modifications.  The total actions for FY11, according to Table 3, were 432, which is 
216 actions per buyer.  This equals 18 actions per CCO per month; however, this 
represents all contract actions, such as construction, services, purchase orders, and 
modifications, which is similar to the previously mentioned squadrons.  Figure 21 shows 
that Eskan Village performed 252 contract actions using the GPC, which equals 10.50 
actions per CCO per month. 
6. Thumrait 
According to the current manning, Thumrait has two CCOs assigned.  One CCO 
is designated the chief of contracting, but, similar to the Eskan Village office, both 
personnel perform contract awards and modifications.  The total actions for FY11, 
according to Table 3, were 718, which is 359 actions per buyer.  This equals 29.92 
actions per CCO per month; however, this represents all contract actions such as 
construction, services, purchase orders, and modifications, which is similar to the 
previously mentioned squadrons.  Figure 24 shows that Thumrait performed 326 contract 
actions using the GPC, which equals 13.58 actions per CCO per month. 
C. POTENTIAL REACHBACK MODEL 
This section provides conceptualized models of the potential reduction in airmen 
from the USAFCENT AOR if reachback is implemented.  Our intent is to show the 
reader the viability of GPC reachback using the several assumptions and constraints that 
should be considered based on the data gathered throughout this research.  AF leaders 
should consider these assumptions and constraints before determining whether the 
potential reductions are viable. 
1. Assumptions and Constraints 
In developing a model for reachback potential, we were required to make several 
assumptions and identify possible constraints.  These assumptions are important so that 
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AF leaders can make decisions using workload averages, instead of using the amount of 
work each CCO actually performs.   The assumptions and constraints address a broad 
area, covering leadership, manning, and workload. 
• Not all personnel on the current USAFCENT manning document perform buying 
responsibilities and, for our analyses, are not counted in the models as CCOs.  See 
Section B above.  
 
• Each squadron must have, at minimum, two personnel at all times.  This assumes 
one person acts as the chief of contracting, and one person is responsible for 
buyer duties and contract administration.     
 
• Not every CCO may perform GPC purchases, depending on their skill level, but 
all CCOs have the ability and training to execute GPC purchases when required.  
Thus, the total number of actions per CCO is divided evenly among all CCOs and 
not by position on the organizational chart. 
 
• The current FY11 monthly average of actions per CCO includes all duty hours 
spent in and out of the office.  For example, these hours could include traveling 
off base to make purchases from host-nation vendors, working badging issues for 
contractors, and performing additional duties. 
 
• Although there is a wide range of actions per CCO between units, this is a 
question for leadership; our model does not address this issue. 
 
• The reduction in management personnel was not analyzed, but if CCOs are 
decreased from a location, fewer management personnel might be appropriate. 
 
• The 376th ECONS is the only unit that awards 100% of GPC purchases stateside. 
2. Development of the Model 
Due to the limitations in the data maintained by the USAFCENT A7/K office, we 
were able to create a model based only on the total actions, GPC actions, and number of 
CCOs currently in each office.  The benefit of creating this model with limited data is to 
show an “apples-to-apples” comparison of each squadron’s workload.  As stated in 
Section B, only the actual number of buyers was used in the model and leadership 
positions were left out.   
All our models are based on the FY11 data given in Tables 4 and 5 (using these 
numbers, we created additional tables using reachback solutions of 25%, 50%, and 75%).  
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USAFCENT does not track the number of GPC actions to stateside vendors, only dollars.  
We wanted to study the consequences of a 50% reduction in GPC actions from total 
USAFCENT actions.  We added 25% and 75% reductions to provide meaningful 
sensitivity analysis. Because the 376th ECONS is the only location where all GPC 
actions are awarded to stateside vendors, a 100% reachback solution was developed only 
for this squadron.  In order to develop the models, we calculated the workload reductions, 
which then led to the potential reductions of CCOs.  We now explain our analysis and the 
calculations we made based on that analysis. 















ECONS 5 2,292 458.40 38.20 
379th 
ECONS 16 3,298 206.13 17.18 
380th 
ECONS 9 2,583 287.00 23.92 
386th 
ECONS 9 1,677 186.33 15.53 
Eskan 
Village 2 432 216.00 18.00 
Thumrait 2 718 359.00 29.92 
USAFCENT 
Total 43 11,000 255.81 21.32 























ECONS 5 557 111.40 9.28 
379th 
ECONS 16 1,465 91.56 7.63 
380th 
ECONS 9 1,530 170.00 14.17 
386th 
ECONS 9 1,348 149.78 12.48 
Eskan 
Village 2 252 126.00 10.50 
Thumrait 2 326 163.00 13.58 
USAFCENT 
Total 43 5,478 127.40 10.62 
 
Because our primary research question focuses only on GPC reachback, our first 
step was to isolate the total GPC actions made by each office (see column 2, Table 5),.  
Using these numbers, we determined the total workload reductions based on 25%, 50%, 
and 75% reductions in GPC actions. 
   379th ECONS Example:  
 
1,465 Total GPC Actions x 25% = 366.25 Total GPC Actions Reduced 
  
The second step was to create a table for Total Actions less x% of GPC actions.  
This calculates the total FY11 workload for a squadron if reachback had been 
implemented. 
379th ECONS Example:  
 
3298 Total Actions – 366.25 GPC Actions =  
2931.75 Total Actions less 25% GPC Actions 
 
The third step was to calculate the new workload per CCO based on the current 
manning at each squadron.     
379th ECONS Example:  
(2931.75 Total Actions ÷ 16 CCOs) ÷ 12 months = 15.27 monthly actions/CCO 
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The final step was to compare the new workload to the current workload in order 
to determine the optimal CCO manning reduction. To find the optimal reduction, we 
decreased the number of CCOs by decrements of one until the new workload ratio 
gradually increased toward the current workload; however, the number of CCOs was not 
decreased if it would cause the new workload to exceed the current workload.  In the 
example below, a 25% reduction in GPC actions at the 379th ECONS would result in a 
one-CCO reduction, because this results in an average number of GPC actions per CCO 
that is closest to the current workload without exceeding it.  A two-CCO reduction results 
in a workload that exceeds the current workload for each CCO, so the potential reduction 
ends at a one-CCO reduction.  In the example below, given our constraints, the minimum 
allowable number of CCOs for the 379th, with a 25% solution, is 15. 
 
 379th ECONS Example:  
 
At 16 CCOs, 
 
Workload = 15.27 monthly actions/CCO  (new workload) 
    < 17.18 monthly actions/CCO   (current workload) 
  
Hence, REDUCE CCO total from 16 to 15 
 
At 15 CCOs, 
 
Workload = 16.29 monthly actions/CCO  (new workload) 
    < 17.18 monthly actions/CCO (current workload) 
  
 Hence, REDUCE CCO total from 15 to 14 
 
At 14 CCOs, 
 
Workload = 17.45 monthly actions/CCO (new workload)  
    > 17.18 monthly actions/CCO (current workload) 
  
 Hence, DO NOT REDUCE CCO total to 14.   
 
Figure 29 provides a visual representation of the new workload reductions using 
the 25%, 50%, and 75% solutions based on the model shown in Table 6.  Based on this 
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data, Figure 30 shows a visual representation of the CCO reductions.  Table 6 shows the 
final result of the model and the potential reduction of CCOs.  Subsection 3, 
Interpretation of the Models, provides a detailed explanation of the model developed 
using the methodology in this subsection. 
 
 




Figure 30.   Potential Reduction of CCOs 














ECONS 5 2,152.75 430.55 35.88 
379th 
ECONS 15 2,931.75 195.45 16.29 
380th 
ECONS 8 2,200.50 275.06 22.92 
386th 
ECONS 8 1,340.00 167.50 13.96 
Eskan Village 2 369.00 184.50 15.38 
Thumrait 2 636.50 318.25 26.52 
USAFCENT 
Total 40 9,630.50 240.76 20.06 














ECONS 5 2,013.50 402.70 33.56 
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379th 
ECONS 13 2,565.50 197.35 16.45 
380th 
ECONS 7 1,818.00 259.71 21.64 
386th 
ECONS 6 1,003.00 167.17 13.93 
Eskan Village 2 306.00 153.00 12.75 
Thumrait 2 555.00 277.50 23.13 
USAFCENT 
Total 35 8,261.00 236.03 19.67 














ECONS 5 1,874.25 374.85 31.24 
379th 
ECONS 11 2,199.25 199.93 16.66 
380th 
ECONS 6 1,435.5 239.25 19.94 
386th 
ECONS 4 666 166.50 13.88 
Eskan Village 2 243 121.50 10.13 
Thumrait 2 473.5 236.75 19.73 
USAFCENT 
Total 30 6,891.5 229.72 19.14 













th ECONS 4 1,592 398.00 33.17 
 
3. Interpretation of the Models 
In this subsection, we present an interpretation of the reduction models developed 
in Subsection 1, using the constraints and assumptions presented in Subsection 2.  Based 
on benchmark numbers from the RICC non-complex division (F. Lacey, personal 
communication, October 14, 2011), we used 37 monthly actions/CCO as the average 
workload ,for determining the number of personnel needed for a reachback cell using the 
25%, 50%, and 75% solutions. 
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a. USAFCENT 
The overall numbers for workload and personnel reduction for 
USAFCENT are composed of the reduced numbers of each ECONS.  As shown in Figure 
29, the projected total actions after 25%, 50%, and 75% GPC reductions were 9,630.5, 
8,261, and 6,891.5, respectively.  As Figure 30 shows, the number of personnel dropped 
from a total of 43 CCOs, to 39 at 25%, 35 at 50%, and 30 at 75%.  This was a reduction 
of 4, 8, and 13 personnel, respectively.   
b. 376th ECONS 
The 376th is unique in that it’s the only ECONs location that does not use 
the GPC in the host nation.  Although we used the same percentages for this location as 
for the other locations, we also added a 100% data point.  As shown in Figure 29, the 
projected total actions after 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% GPC reductions were 2,152.75, 
2,013.5, 1,874.25, and 1,592, respectively.  As shown in Figure 30, the number of 
personnel required remained constant until 100% of the actions were performed stateside; 
at this point, the 376th could lose one person. 
c. 379th ECONS 
As shown in Figure 29, the projected total actions after 25%, 50%, and 
75% GPC reductions were 2,931.75, 2,565.5, and 2,199.25, respectively.  As Figure 30 
shows, the number of personnel dropped from a total of 16 CCOs, to 15 at 25%, 13 at 
50%, and 11 at 75%.  This was a reduction of 1, 3, and 5 personnel, respectively.   
d. 380th ECONS 
As shown in Figure 29, the projected total actions after 25%, 50%, and 
75% GPC reductions were 2,200.5, 1,818, and 1,435.5, respectively.  As Figure 30 
shows, the number of personnel dropped from a total of 9 CCOs, to 8 at 25%, 7 at 50%, 
and 6 at 75%.  This was a reduction of 1, 2, and 3 personnel, respectively. 
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e. 386th ECONS 
As shown in Figure 29, the projected total actions after 25%, 50%, and 
75% GPC reductions were 1,340, 1,003, and 666, respectively.  As Figure 30 shows, the 
number of personnel dropped from a total number of 9 CCOs, to 8 at 25%, 6 at 50%, and 
4 at 75%.  This was a reduction of 1, 3, and 5 personnel, respectively.   Although the 
386th had the same number of CCOs assigned as the 380th, they lost more personnel 
because they had a lower number of actions per CCO. 
f. Eskan Village 
As shown in Figures 29 and 30, there were no reductions in workload or 
personnel at any percent. As stated in the assumptions, a two-person location was not 
modeled.   
g. Thumrait 
As shown in Figures 29 and 30, there were no reductions in workload or 
personnel at any percent. As stated in the assumptions, a two-person location was not 
modeled. 
h. Required CCOs for a Reachback Cell 
As previously stated, the non-complex division located at Rock Island 
Arsenal, Illinois, has an approximate average of 37 monthly actions per CCO.  In order to 
develop the reachback cell model, we first calculated the number of available actions for 
a reachback cell using the 25%, 50%, and 75% solutions.  We then used those GPC 
action totals to determine how many CCOs would be required if we used the non-
complex average (see the USAFCENT example below) of 37 monthly actions per CCO 
as our benchmark.  As a reference, the reduction of CCOs modeled in Table 6 was used 
as a comparison. 
  USAFCENT Example: 
  At 25%: 11,000  (USAFCENT Total Actions) 
           -    9,630.50  (USAFCENT Total Actions less 25% GPC Actions) 
          =  1,369.50 (GPC Actions available for reachback) 
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  Then: 1,369.50 (GPC Actions available for reachback) 
         ÷   12  (months) 
         = 114.13  (GPC Actions/month available for reachback) 
                               ÷  37  (RICC CCO Actions/month workload) 
         = 3.08  (Required CCOs) 
  
  Hence, using the workload assumption, four CCOs are required at a 
reachback cell.    
 
 
Figure 31.   CCOs Reduced From USAFCENT versus CCOs Needed for Reachback 
Cell 
In Table 6, the number of CCOs reduced was three for the 25% solution, 
eight for the 50% solution, and 13 for the 75% solution.  In Figure 31, the number of 
CCOs needed for a reachback cell is four for the 25% solution, seven for the 50% 
solution, and ten for the 75% solution.  This means that at 25%, one additional CCO is 
needed; at 50%, one fewer CCO is needed; and at 75%, three fewer CCOs are needed.  
Figure 31 has two trend lines that show how sensitive CCO reductions and additions are 
to the GPC reduction solutions.   The intersection represents a 1:1 ratio of CCOs reduced 
in USAFCENT to CCOs needed for a reachback cell.  The area to the right of the 
intersection shows the efficiencies gained with a higher percentage of GPC actions 
reduced.  For example, at a 75% solution, 13 CCOs can be reduced from the AOR, but 10 
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CCOs are needed for the reachback cell.  This means that three personnel are removed 
completely from the deployment cycle and can now spend valuable time at their home-
station unit gaining contracting experience.    
     
 
Figure 32.   CCOs Reduced From USAFCENT With 100% 376th GPC Reduction 
versus CCOs Needed for Reachback Cell 
Figure 32 depicts the CCO reduction efficiency if the 376th 100% 
reduction was implemented in all reduction solutions.  The total CCO reduction increased 
by one to account for the loss of one CCO from the 376th.  This means the CCO 
reduction at 25%, 50%, and 75% would be four, nine, and 14, respectively.  The CCOs 
needed for the reachback cell was five, eight, and 10.  This means that at 25%, the 376th 
would need one additional CCO; at 50%, one fewer CCO; and at 75%, four fewer CCOs. 
Figures 33–36 depict the average number of actions per CCO, depending 
on the manning level of the particular ECONS and the number of GPC actions reduced.  
The reference line depicts the average per CCO for FY11 with no reductions in GPC 
actions.  Any bar below the line means that if the ECONS were manned at that level, the 
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actions per CCO would be fewer than the current actions per CCO for FY11.  Any bar 
above means the ECONS would increase the actions per CCO if the ECONS were 
reduced to that number of personnel. 
   
  379th ECONS Leadership Problem Example: (based on Figure 34) 
  Col Jones asks, “Maj Chan, if I reduced your squadron manning from 16  
  to 12 CCOs, what would your workload per CCO be?” 
  At 25% Solution: 
  If the desired CCO manning is 12, 
 then, move the black bar up the Y-axis until it is tangent with top of the 12 
CCO manning bar. 
  So, the minimum required workload equals 20.36 Monthly Actions/CCO. 
These figures are helpful as a reference for leadership to see how the 
number of personnel affects the number of actions per CCO.  For example, if it was 
determined that an ECONS could move up their rate of action per CCO, it would be easy 
to pinpoint how many CCOs were needed at the 25%, 50%, and 75% solutions.  Figure 
33 is unique in that it pertains to the 376th, which only has the 100% reduction.  The 









Figure 33.   376th Required CCOs at x Manning  







Figure 34.   379th Required CCOs at x Manning 
Note: The black bar equals the current workload of 17.18 monthly actions/CCO. 
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Figure 35.   380th Required CCOs at x Manning   
 Note: The black bar equals the current workload of 23.92 monthly actions/CCO.  
 
Figure 36.   386th Required CCOs at x Manning      
 Note: The black bar equals the current workload of 15.53 monthly actions/CCO.  
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D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided our findings and analysis of the data from Chapter 
III.  This included the interpretation of the data and the methodology we used to 
determine workload averages per CCO for each squadron.  Using the monthly actions per 
CCO based on the current FY11, we calculated the potential CCO reductions when 25%, 
50%, and 75% of GPC actions were reduced from the total actions.  Through the use of 
visual aids, readers will understand that reductions can be made throughout USAFCENT, 
especially to the three larger squadrons: the 379th, 380th, and 386th ECONS.  Because 
the 376th ECONS is the only squadron that does 100% of its GPC actions with stateside 
vendors, we determined that one additional CCO can always be reduced AOR-wide, even 
if the other squadrons are subject to the 25%, 50%, and 75% solutions.  After our 
interpretation of the data, we discussed the assumptions and constraints we followed 
before calculating the potential reductions.  These assumptions and constraints should be 
considered by leadership before making any decision on the reduction potentials.  Finally, 
we presented the number of CCOs required at a reachback cell using the RICC workload 
as a benchmark. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to answer our primary research question, What 
is reachback viability for USAFCENT Government Purchase Card (GPC) purchases?  As 
stated in Chapter I, there are more reasons to reachback than just managing the military 
supply chain.  Deploying members to the AOR comes with burdens placed on home-
station personnel and the family members of the deployed member.  If decentralizing 
GPC purchases at a reachback cell can reduce at least one person in the USAFCENT 
AOR, AF leadership should consider it.  Along with our primary research questions, four 
subsidiary questions guided our study. 
In Chapter II, we answered the subsidiary questions, is the U.S. military currently 
employing reachback for contingencies? And, what are the advantages and disadvantages 
of reachback? We learned that the U.S. military does currently employ reachback across 
all the branches.  Air Force has applied reachback for civil engineering support through 
AFCESA and combat support through RPA.  The Army has taken tremendous steps in 
creating the Rock Island Contracting Center (RICC)–Reachback Division.  The non-
complex division of RICC currently does purchase orders and GPC reachback for Joint 
Theater Support Contracting Command.  This unit serves as a prime example that 
reachback could be done for USAFCENT.  We discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of reachback using research conducted by the RAND Corporation 
researchers (Ausink et al., 2011) and the USAFCENT PMA team (Benivegna et al., 
2011). We also discussed business organization concepts, such as centralization.  We 
showed where reachback could be advantageous to the four phases of contingency 
contracting and the Phase Zero theory (Yoder, 2008). 
In Chapter III, we analyzed data provided by USAFCENT (AUAB CAOC, 2011) 
in order to answer the subsidiary research question, What percentage of GPC purchases 
in the AOR are provided by U.S. vendors/supplier?  Due to the limitations of the data, we 
were only able to determine the percentage of dollars spent in the U.S.  However, we 
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were able to extrapolate the data and determine the number of total actions awarded to 
U.S. vendors.  Using this information and the current manning levels of USAFCENT, a 
monthly actions/CCO workload was calculated for each base.  We also presented a side-
by-side comparison of each contracting office’s statistics so that AF leaders could 
observe workload trends through the AOR.  
In Chapter IV, we interpreted the data presented in Chapter III in order to answer 
the subsidiary question, what would a USAFCENT personnel reduction model look like?  
Because there wasn’t sufficient data on total GPC actions awarded to U.S. 
vendors/suppliers, we developed models where 25%, 50%, and 75% of GPC actions were 
reduced from USAFCENT total actions and sent to a reachback cell.  Using assumptions 
and constraints set by our research, we determined that personnel can be reduced using 
GPC reachback cells.  In fact, with a 75% USAFCENT GPC reduction combined with a 
100% 376th ECONS GPC reduction, 14 personnel can be reduced from the AOR and 
only 10 are needed at a reachback center.   
B. CONCLUSIONS  
1. GPC Reachback is Viable 
Based on our primary research question, What is the reachback viability for 
USAFCENT GPC purchases?, our conclusion is that reachback is not only viable but 
should be implemented for its benefits.   Even at low-scale utilization, if 25% of GPC 
actions were awarded stateside (plus the additional CCO from the 376th), four CCOs 
could be moved to a reachback cell for a reduction of 9.3% in the current manning.  At 
the high end of the scale, if 75% of GPC actions were awarded stateside (plus the 
additional CCO from the 376th), 14 CCOs could be moved to a reachback cell, which 
would be a 42.33% reduction in the current manning.  Any increase over 75% would 
result in additional CCOs that could be moved to a reachback cell.  As noted in Chapter 
IV, this reduction would not increase the contracting actions per CCO of the personnel 
that would be left at each ECONS. 
There are additional benefits other than the reduction of currently deployed 
personnel.  By establishing a CONUS reachback cell, the deployment pool could be 
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increased by utilizing personnel medically unqualified to deploy overseas.  This increase 
of the deployment pool would increase the time CCOs spend at their home-station before 
re-deploying.  Another benefit is that by consolidating the personnel from the ECONs 
into one office, the number of CCOs needed to accomplish the work could decrease.  For 
example, if 75% of the actions were awarded stateside (plus the additional CCO from the 
376th), 14 CCOs could be reduced in the AOR, but the reachback cell would only need 
10 CCOs to do the work.  This means four fewer CCOs would be deployed every six 
months.     
As mentioned in the RAND focus groups, deployments are a major contribution 
to retention issues.  By reducing the number of deployed personnel and increasing the 
dwell time, the Air Force could increase its retention rate.   There would also be a 
monetary savings due to the decrease in the number of personnel sent to training and to 
deployed locations. After a review of all the data, we conclude that reachback for GPC 
purchases is viable and should be implemented as soon as possible.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research presented in previous chapters, we make three primary 
recommendations.   
1. Reachback Test Cell 
We recommend that USAFCENT should immediately establish a reachback test 
cell in order to put the theory into practice.  By creating a test cell, USAFCENT can 
determine the efficacy of reachback and gather data over a specified amount of time. We 
recommend a minimum of two deployment cycles to ensure the cell is able to capitalize 
on its capabilities and efficiencies.  The data will help determine appropriate manning 
levels (to include if civilian positions are needed), funding, best practices, whether or not 
the current test cell location is effective, and lessons learned.  By testing this model now, 
USAFCENT can determine the effectiveness of reachback and, if the test is successful, it 
can become a broader part of the Air Force’s contracting policy.  We should not wait for 
the next war before implementing reachback; this initiative should happen now.   
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2. Operational Plans 
We suggest adding reachback cell capabilities to current policies, such as Joint 
Publication 4-10 (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2008), the Defense Contingency 
Contracting Handbook (Yoder et al., 2010), and any additional future operational plan 
that pertains to contingency contracting.  The Army currently performs reachback and, as 
shown in our research, reachback for USAFCENT is viable.  To make sure reachback 
opportunities are evaluated for possible implementation in any current or future 
contingency, it is imperative for it to become part of all contingency plans.  This does not 
mean reachback will be the right answer for every contingency, but that it is at least part 
of the tools that are debated when a contingency happens.  If a reachback cell is deemed 
necessary at the beginning of a deployment, it can help reduce boots on ground and can 
be a force multiplier for the troops that do deploy. 
3. Data Collection 
Accurate, detailed information is important and can be used to identify 
efficiencies that might be gained in deployed contracting.  It is the recommendation of 
the researchers that USAFCENT collect the number of GPC actions performed stateside 
and in the host nation.  Only the number of dollars spent in the host nation is collected 
currently, which is good, but without the number of actions is incomplete.  For example, 
if $10,000 was counted as host nation dollars, this spending could be the result of one 
$10,000 action or of 30 separate actions.  Without the action number, leadership can only 
guess how many actions are awarded to the host nation.  Adding this measurement would 
not incur a large amount of manpower. Depending on the database the ECONs use, the 
solution could be as simple as adding a checkbox.   This number would allow leadership 
to quickly determine how many actions are being performed stateside and the percentage 
of those actions to total actions.   
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Workload Study 
There is a wide range in the number of actions per CCO at USAFENT locations.  
This could be due to numerous factors, but these factors should be reevaluated.  This is 
important not only because some ECONs might be overemployed, but also because some 
might be underemployed.  At the same time, it would be beneficial to understand why 
there is such a difference in the number of actions per CCO between the ECONs.  This 
could be due to an innovation at a unit or possibly a streamlined approach at another.  
Quantifying these differences would allow management to better understand them and 
could possibly change the allocation of resources. We recommend a workload study as 
soon as possible to help identify the optimum personnel at each location. 
2. Additional Reachback 
While this research only looked at GPC purchases, the authors recommend doing 
additional research on reachback to include purchase orders, close-out, and major source 
selections.  Each additional type of reachback should be studied to look at the effects it 
would have on each ECON.  By performing reachback on other parts of the procurement 
process, additional personnel could possibly be moved from a deployed location to the 
reachback cell.  This would also have all the additional benefits discussed for GPC 
reachback. If the implementation of the GPC reachback cell is considered a success, then 
additional processes could be added, if deemed feasible.   
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